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Abstract 
 
The Arab ‘hegemonic debate’ on the causes of Islamist terrorism nurtures (pan-) Arab, anti-
western sentiments and delegitimizes criticism of the political status quo. The European Union’s 
emphasis on multilateral means of conflict resolution and trade promotion leads to official pro-
nouncements that barely address the Arab world’s domestic problems, instead referring to inter-
national tensions such as the Arab-Israeli conflict as a particular cause of Islamist terrorism and 
the need for cooperation with Arab governments. By failing to challenge the official narratives of 
authoritarian Arab regimes the EU obstructs interests in the democratization of the region and 
the delegitimization of Islamist violence.  
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Introduction  
Researching the coincidences between the government-condoned Arab debate on the ‘root caus-
es’ of Islamist terrorism and the EU’s statements on that matter, we do not argue, or assume, that 
there would be a/one proper way of discussing or ‘representing’ terrorism and its causes. Indeed, 
we acknowledge that any kind of public and political attention to terrorism may function in fa-
vour of the terrorists’ strategic calculus simply by emphasising the phenomenon.2 Due to asym-
metric power relations between terrorist groups and well-established governments (authoritarian 
and democratic alike), each kind of discussion benefits the aspirations of the asymmetrically 
weaker part (in this case the terrorist groups). This raises the paradoxical and serious question of 
how to appropriately approach a discussion of ‘terrorism’ – even under the condition that the par-
ticipants agree on a definition.
3
 
When analysing debates, we intentionally avoid the term ‘discourse’ as it automatically resem-
bles the Foucauldian concept of ‘discourse analysis’. While we try to avoid the broad empirical 
focus of Foucault’s concept, we do – though in a Foucauldian manner – recognize and use its 
achievement of directing academic analysis toward the distinct power aspirations which stand 
behind certain communicated world views and their terminologies as well as the power relations 
which might be their (un)intentional result.
4
 This perspective enables us to enquire into the polit-
ical consequences of representing and talking about terrorism and to relate the Arab and EU 
statements on Islamist terrorism to their affirmation of authoritarian governance in the cases of 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  
Our analysis concentrates explicitly on the portrayal of perceived causes of Islamist terrorism. 
We, therefore, evaluated general discussions on counter-terrorism only in so far as they allow 
conclusions on how causes of terrorism are construed. The selection of our examples was based 
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on the rationale that Egypt and Saudi Arabia enjoy considerable religious, cultural and political 
prominence in the Arab and broader Muslim world. In the context of the Egyptian and Saudi 
Arabian debate we analysed the semi-official Egyptian Al-Ahram newspaper and the privately 
owned Saudi Ash-Sharq al-Awsat. While the latter has a broader regional outlook, the fact that 
its main revenue is generated within the Saudi market compels it to take ‘Saudi sensitivities’ into 
account. The inclusion of the English-language Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt) and Arab News (Saudi 
Arabia) allowed us to assess the respective regimes’ strategies of shaping international opinion.  
With regard to the problem of how to talk about terrorism, the EU – i.e. not its single member 
states – appeared to be a particularly intriguing choice as a case study, because it is the interna-
tional actor most concerned with a balanced political language, with impartial diplomatic efforts 
and with anti-bellicose policies. However, we will point out that these efforts of ‘respectful ob-
jectivity’ and a global multilateral socio-political agenda initiate the problem of ‘talking about 
terrorism’ in such a way as it conflicts with the EU’s commitments to, and rhetoric of, democrat-
ic rule of law and human rights. Documents studied in the EU context are speeches by EU offi-
cials, primarily from and on behalf of the EU Commission as well as EU policy papers and dec-
larations.  
To limit the amount of the available Arabic material, while at the same time allowing for time- 
and space-related shifts in arguments, our research focused on specific time frames. These are 
the first two weeks after the attacks of 9/11, on a housing compound for foreign nationals in Ri-
yadh in May 2003, after the bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, as 
well as after the attacks on tourist resorts in Egypt in October 2004 and July 2005. This allowed 
us to generate sufficient material to make general observations about the way those various inci-
dents were being framed in influential Arab news outlets.  
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While emphasizing the anti-liberal tone of the dominant Arab arguments on Islamist terrorism, 
we do not offer an attempt to establish the latter’s ‘root causes’. Instead, we focus on the ques-
tion of how the construction of and emphasis on possible ‘root causes’ reflects and serves partic-
ular political agendas. Our conclusion is that although the European Union and the authoritarian 
governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia are very different international actors with regard to 
their institutional set-up, foreign policies and self-perception they end up supporting comparable 
narratives on the causes of Islamist terrorism. By confronting the examples of the prevalent Arab 
arguments with marginalized liberal Arab interpretations of the analyzed events, we attempt to 
highlight the extent to which the EU’s reluctance to more openly make the internal (political) 
predicaments of the Arab world a subject of discussion is helping to sideline alternative, anti-
authoritarian Arab voices. 
 
The Authoritarian Arab Interpretation of the Causes of Islamist Terrorism 
Islamist Terrorism as a Result of Western Aggression  
 
What is striking about the way the Egyptian newspapers Al-Ahram and Al-Ahram Weekly cover 
domestic and international Islamist violence is that irrespective of the political context and likely 
perpetrators of the particular attack the reader is always reminded of a history of ‘western ag-
gression’ against the Arab and Muslim world. Depending on the author, this might also include 
references to specific U.S. foreign policies and often the very existence of the state of Israel.  
On September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden’s choice of targets obviously facilitated exactly this 
kind of framing that became prevalent in the Arab world. Representing an often repeated senti-
ment, Al-Ahram’s daily columnist Salih Muntasir and guest commentator Muhyi ad-Din 
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´Amirmur claimed that on that horrific Tuesday morning the United States tasted the ‘fire which 
it burned others with’5 and ‘experienced for the first time on its soil a situation of war, which 
many countries had suffered from that had been exposed to American bombardments in the last 
century, from Germany to Japan, from Vietnam to Baghdad.’6 Prominent Egyptian commentator 
Salama Ahmed Salama explained to his western readers that Islamist terrorism had thus simply 
to be understood as a reaction to western provocation and the U.S. ‘planting the seeds of terror-
ism in the Middle East (by endorsing Israel’s policies)’,7 a statement he reiterated after the terror-
ist attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2005.
8
  
Another line of this argument depicts Israel as the beneficiary of the spread of Islamist terrorism 
through its instrumentalisation of U.S. power. After 9/11, Karim Baqr Adwani claimed that the 
Zionist lobby pushed the United States to precipitously enter a war ‘with no limit in time and 
space.’9 Former PLO press officer Bassam Abu Sharīf criticized what he perceived to be ‘Ariel 
Sharon’s attempts to exploit the criminal operations in America’ to influence American public 
opinion against Muslims and Arabs and prominent columnist Samir Attallah portrayed the Sha-
ron government as the cause and greatest beneficiary of the U.S. ‘catastrophes’.10 
The extent to which these attempts of Arab nationalist and Islamist commentators to link their 
ideological preferences to the threat of terrorism fall in line with the interests of the ruling elites 
is highlighted by the fact that Al-Ahram’s editors explained the terrorist attacks of Riyadh, Ma-
drid, and London with the United States’ ‘blind partisanship toward Israel’ as well as the latter’s 
‘crimes against the Palestinians’ and ‘its threat to the Arab countries’.11 This line of reasoning 
reflects the interests of the Arab regimes insofar as it not only allowed them to externalize the 
‘root causes’ of Islamist terrorism, but also to delegitimize the latter in a manner that avoids any 
need to address domestic conditions that might have caused the emergence of Islamist radicaliza-
 7 
tion in the first place. By portraying Islamist terrorism as the result of western policies in general 
and Israeli policies in particular, the Egyptian and Saudi government try to rid themselves of any 
kind of responsibility and circumvent the question as to whether the lack of venues for peaceful 
political participation, the increasing dominance of narrow interpretations of anti-modern reli-
gious thinking as well as the anti-western hegemonic debate itself might be factors in the emer-
gence of Islamist terrorism. In other words, Islamist terrorism is simply an ‘understandable’ de-
fensive reaction to western aggression, but amounts to the wrong strategic choice as it only 
serves Israel’s objectives. This last aspect was particularly stressed in the authoritarian framing 
of those Islamist terror attacks that took place in the Arab world itself. 
For instance, in the aftermath of the second terrorist attack on the Egyptian Sinai peninsula with-
in a year, al-Ahram’s ΄Atif al-Ghamri editorialized in the summer of 2005 that the terrorist ac-
tivities in the region occurred in response to the U.S. presence in Iraq and benefited Israel as the 
domestic destabilization of Arab countries would eventually clear the way for Israel’s drive to-
ward regional hegemony.
12
 His framing resembles Ash-Sharq al-Awsat’s attempt to delegitimize 
Islamist terrorism by lambasting the perpetrators of the attack in Riyadh for engaging in ‘mean-
ingless’ terrorism at a time when ‘sensitive circumstances’ (i.e. Saddam Hussein had been top-
pled only a couple of days earlier) necessitated ‘solidarity among all Muslims and Arabs, be-
tween governments and people.’13  
On a more general level, the debate supported by authoritarian Arab governments includes fre-
quent references to a supposed general western anti-Muslim attitude. Given their precarious do-
mestic legitimacy, Arab governments are accepting the close association with particular interpre-
tations of Islam as long as these serve to support existing power structures.
14
 This goes hand in 
hand with the attempt to present themselves as the guardians of Islam and Muslims in general. In 
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the time frame covered in our analysis this was especially prevalent in the Saudi debate. In his 
newspapers’ initial reaction to the events of 9/11, Arab News’ editor-in-chief Khaled al-Maeena 
explained to his English-speaking global audience that ‘terrorists have no religion and country’.15 
This reasoning may be understood as a deliberate distraction from possible links between terror-
ist violence and the nationalist Wahhabi interpretation of Islam that forms one of the pillars of 
the Saudi monarchy’s claim to power. It therefore did not come as a surprise when the Saudi 
minister of the interior, Prince Naif, announced in October 2001 that no ‘western smear cam-
paign’ would prevent the Saudi government from ‘following the sharia’.16 One year later, his 
close relationship with the religious establishment led him to publicly state that he considered 
‘the Zionists’ to be responsible for the attacks of 9/11 and called the Muslim Brotherhood the 
origin of all problems in the region.
17
 This statement reflects a central streak of internal Saudi-
Arabian discussions. In order to absolve the pro-government Wahhabi clerics of any responsibili-
ties for the domestic and global escalation of Islamist violence, their defenders point to the fact 
that the fateful method of takfir, i.e. the denunciation of other Muslims as infidels, had been ‘in-
vented’ by radical 1970s splinter groups of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.18  
The discussion of possible links between specific interpretations of Islam and terrorist violence 
was further discredited by commentators such as Salama Ahmad Salama, who in both his Eng-
lish and Arabic columns depicted a post-9/11 ‘war hysteria’ that had supposedly generated the 
search for a ‘scapegoat’ and ‘waves of racist hatred’ against Arabs and Muslims living in the 
West.
19
 The anti-Semitic overtones detectable in many commentaries that try to link Israel to Is-
lamist terrorism became even more pronounced when prominent Lebanese commentator Samir 
Attallah used his column in Ash-Sharq al-Awsat to claim that ‘the Arabs in America feel that 
they are being targeted like the Jews in Germany before the war’.20 When Islamist commentator 
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Fahmy Howeidi called for an ‘international alliance against hatred’21 he was not talking about 
the hatred that prompted nineteen young men to commit mass murder on 9/11, but referred to 
what he described as the ‘anti-Islamic hatred’ instigated by the ‘Jewish lobby’. He quotes ‘west-
ern’ examples of acts of anti-Islamic hate and jingoistic statements, which then support his con-
struction of the image of a ‘campaign’ (‘himla’) that conveys carries forward the very narrative 
of Muslim victimhood upon which, again, terrorist recruiters feed.
22
 
 
Turning the Arab State from Cause into Cure 
Authoritarian governments in countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia benefit from these de-
bates not only through the externalization of ‘root causes’ of terrorism and its delegitimisation as 
promoting the agenda of ‘foreign’ powers. The construction of a linkage between Islamist terror-
ism and international crises that can (only) be addressed through multilateral diplomacy under 
the lead of Arab countries also turn these regimes from possible ‘causes’ into definite ‘cures’. 
With the attack in Riyadh coinciding with former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s attempt 
to gather regional support for the ‘Road Map’ to peace between Israelis and Palestinians,23 the 
coverage of, and symbolism associated with, terrorism allowed these regimes to highlight what 
they would like the international community to view as their essential role in solving regional 
conflicts. By linking Islamist terrorism to external forces of the Arab-Israeli conflict (and even-
tually to the war in Iraq), the Arab world’s pro-Egyptian and pro-Saudi intellectual elites could 
claim that Cairo’s long-established diplomatic bona fides and Riyadh new-found impact allow 
them to play a central role in any meaningful attempts of western countries dealing with their 
security concerns.
24
 It is therefore not surprising that every major terrorist incident of the last six 
years was followed by an editorial in Al-Ahram calling for an international conference under 
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Egyptian auspices.
25
 After 9/11, Ibrahim Nafie, Al-Ahram’s editor-in-chief, hailed Hosni Mubar-
ak as ‘the first world leader to caution that terrorism had become one of the most pernicious 
forms of organized crime’ and called for an international conference that amongst other things 
should work toward a distinction between ‘terrorism’ and (Palestinian) ‘national liberation’. 
Nafie’s declaration that Egypt, a ‘pivotal regional power’, could provide the Arab world with a 
‘voice in channelling international anti-terrorist efforts’ underscores the extent to which the offi-
cial Egyptian terrorism debate is dominated by attempts to demonstrate this country’s regional 
and global importance.
26
 From a European perspective, Nafie’s claim that Egypt, which has been 
subject to a special investigation of the United Nations committee set up under the authority of 
the global convention against torture,
27
 possesses a ‘storehouse of ideas concerning the legal and 
logistical requirements for organizing a global conference to formulate a comprehensive interna-
tional anti-terrorist convention’ immediately raises the question of whether those ideas are com-
patible with human rights norms. Al-Ahram followed a similar logic based on the portrayal of 
anti-Muslim sentiment by praising President Mubarak for raising his voice against the ‘calls for 
revenge’ that supposedly singled out Arabs and Muslims in the western world. According to Al-
Ahram, western governments can prove their good will towards the Muslims and Arabs by 
agreeing to an international conference under Egyptian auspices.
28
 Thus, the image of ‘the’ anti-
Muslim West in general and the call to take into account external forces with respect to the Arab-
Israeli conflict in particular serve the interest of the authoritarian regime in Cairo in polishing its 
domestic and international credibility after its dictatorial crackdown that aimed to ensure the 
transition of power from father (Hosni Mubarak) to son (Gamal Mubarak), an action that runs 
counter to any democratic norm. 
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The prevalence of the notion that the overall goal of western policy is the weakening of Arab so-
cieties also allows the authoritarian Arab governments to delegitimize any western attempt to use 
its leverage in order to force them to open up avenues of peaceful political participation in coun-
ter-terrorist policies. Some days after the attacks of 9/11, Al-Ahram published an editorial which 
delineated a long list of issues that had to be addressed in the fight against terrorism. On the do-
mestic front its authors counted among the most important things equal political, social, and ju-
dicial rights; the development of an open democratic system, which provides the opportunity for 
political engagement for all citizens; and efforts against unemployment.
29
 While this might 
sound like an invitation for western engagement, the subsequent section of his editorial stresses 
the limits of possible western influence. The call to respect the ‘sovereignty of countries and 
peoples’, to distance itself from the ‘arrogance of power’ (‘ghatrasat ul-quwa’) as well as the 
‘violation’ (‘intihāk’) of the rights of other powers closely resembles those phrases which Middle 
Eastern potentates and their nationalist allies use to deflect any external call for or support of 
domestic reforms in their countries.
30
 
When the United States (more forcefully than the EU) started to discuss the necessity of political 
reform in the Arab world, long-time Al-Ahram columnist Hani Shukrallah criticized ‘western 
pundits’ and ‘Arab neo-liberals’ for their suggestion that Arabs and Muslims should start looking 
for domestic reasons for terrorist violence. Instead, he claimed that events such as ‘the Taba 
bombings are directly and most profoundly connected to the ongoing butchery in Palestine and 
Iraq at Israeli and American hands.’31 In another opinion piece Salama Ahmed Salama managed 
to feature all the typical elements of the dominant voices in the Arab debate in an ideal-type 
manner in his attempt to discredit the Greater Middle East Initiative
32
 and to deny Israel’s right 
to exist: 
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‘Maybe it has been the essential mistake in the treatment of the phenomenon of terrorism that the 
whole world marched after the American understanding, which was prevalent after the events of 
September and which considered terrorism as a revelation of the backwardness, tyranny and igno-
rance in the Arab and Muslim world. Therefore its solution was the transport of the battle into the 
heart of the region, beginning with the assault on Afghanistan, leading to the occupation of Iraq, 
and the decree of a reform program, whilst the true causes of terrorism have been ignored. They are 
rooted in the fights which were triggered by the colonialist, expansionist Israeli existence and what 
resulted from it.’33  
 
The Liberal Counter-Narrative  
The arguments of the nationalist and Islamist side of the debate stand in stark contrast to those of 
the limited number of liberal commentators such as Egyptian Muhammad as-Sayyid Sa΄id and 
Kuwaiti Ahmad ar-Ruba´i who criticized the ‘gloating and lack of sympathy’ and ‘Schaden-
freude’ towards the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.34 Interestingly, both felt compelled to 
link their morally-based critique with a utility-based argument about the possible negative effects 
such public celebrations might have for the PLO in particular and the Arabs in general.
35
  
In their critique, as-Sayyid Sa´id and ar-Ruba`i were joined by Egyptian commentator Mamoun 
Fandy who used his column in Ash-Sharq al-Awsat to pounce on those who criticized the crimes 
of 9/11 while trying to rationalize them. For him the fact that U.S. politicians defended American 
Muslims and Arabs in an hour of ‘greatest rage and grief’ symbolized the ‘humanity’ of U.S. so-
ciety.
36
 Abdel-Moneim Said, liberal columnist and director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political 
and Strategic Studies, declared the ‘claim that horrors happening to Muslims go unnoticed’ to be 
‘as common as it is insidious’ which helps to create the ‘culture of alienation’ the organizers of 
terrorist attacks would feed upon.
37
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After the terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005, ΄Abdallah ΄Abd as-Salam issued a stinging 
critique of those ‘who hurry to criticize terrorism against civilians only to add that it is our duty 
to remember that the West is currently conducting a crusade against the Arabs and Muslims.’ 
This would translate into telling the terrorists that their cause is just and that they ‘only err with 
your targets’.38 He points out that in the western world ‘millions demonstrated against the Iraq 
war’, that the terrorist attacks in London occurred when the leaders of the western world were 
discussing debt relief for many Muslim-majority African countries, and that the people in the 
West had been competing with each other to support the mostly Muslim victims of the tsunami 
catastrophe in late 2004.
39
 For him, the only crime that is worse than a terrorist attack is the kind 
of discourse that tries to involve Muslims and Arabs in a holy war.
40
 
The discussions of the political role of Islam(ism) reflect the different Egyptian and Saudi claims 
to power. Whereas the Egyptian regime is binding itself ever closer to the religious elite of al-
Azhar in their common struggle against Islamist and liberal opposition voices alike,
41
 some 
members of the ruling elite in Saudi Arabia have realized that specific interpretations of Islam 
undermine its power.
42
 The fact that liberal calls for a rigorous self-examination of religious 
elites are prevalent in the two analyzed Saudi publications can therefore be understood not only 
as a means of brandishing the kingdom’s international image, but also as a means of influencing 
the new domestic discussion about the role of Islam. 
Here, the events of May 2003 proved to be particularly influential in broadening the boundaries 
of what was acceptable to be discussed in the Saudi context. This situation was made possible 
through the fact that – in contrast to Egypt – the schism between proponents and opponents of 
political and societal reforms is not equivalent to the frontline between regime and opposition, 
but is represented in both. This enabled Arab News to describe the attackers as ‘the new fas-
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cists’.43 The linking of Islamism with Fascism was picked up by Amir Taheri who saw similari-
ties between Islamism and Fascism inasmuch as both would emphasize the abstract community 
at the expense of the individual, with Islamist thinkers like Khomeini, Qutb and Mawdudi being 
‘more influenced by Western totalitarian ideologies than by classical Islamic thought.’44 Arab 
News even urged its readers to come to terms with the fact that ‘we have a terrorist problem here’ 
and criticized Saudi Arabia for having tried to ignore the domestic aspects of the events of 9/11, 
instead clinging to the ‘fantasy’ of Israeli or CIA involvement. It also criticized any attempt to 
differentiate between acceptable terrorism in Israel and Russia and the terrorism taking place in 
Saudi Arabia and called for putting an end to the ‘cult of suicide bombings’.45 
The expanding scope of the permissible within the Saudi debate became notably visible in Ash-
Sharq al-Awsat’s commentaries on the terrorist attacks in London. British guest commentator 
Adel Darwish, who also publishes in The Independent, The Daily Telegraph and Time, described 
al Qaeda’s goal to be ‘terrorism for the sake of terrorism’ and called upon the leaders of the Arab 
countries, their political parties, religious dignitaries, and intellectuals to unequivocally condemn 
terrorism: ‘We await the condemnation of every form of terrorism from the top of the mosques’ 
pulpits.’46 Ash-Sharq al-Awsat’s Amir Taheri detected the basic problem in the ‘speech of those 
who divide humanity into ‘believers’ and ‘non-believers’ and spread hatred of other religions’. 
According to him, it is therefore necessary to develop a new religious speech which stresses the 
value of human existence and the value of life.
47
 Egyptian Liberal Magdi Khalil explicitly agreed 
with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s statement that the solution to the problem of 
terrorism could ultimately only be found within the Islamic world itself.
48
 Mamoun Fandy joined 
in with the declaration that the only two things that could eventually end this form of terrorism 
were Osama Bin Laden’s ‘expulsion from Islam’ and the end of western naivety toward the Is-
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lamists.
49
 That this line of reasoning fell within the general view of an important fraction within 
Saudi Arabia’s political elite is demonstrated by a joined op-ed of then-Saudi Arabia’s ambassa-
dor to the UK, Turki al-Faisal, and Lord Kerry who portrayed al-Qaeda as ‘unislamic’ and called 
upon the western countries to protect peace-loving Muslims and prevent extremists from exploit-
ing western liberties.
50
 
 
The EU Debate 
Focus on International Conflicts and Cooperation 
Given the authoritarian Arab governments’ skilfulness in playing on the (increasing) European 
fear of being branded anti-Muslim, official EU statements tend to retreat to the safer rhetorical 
ground of stressing the link between the rise of Islamist terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Throughout individual speeches and articles by EU politicians as well as papers from EU institu-
tions, the unsolved nature and increasingly violent conduct of this conflict is presented as one of 
the main reasons for the emergence of Islamist terrorism. The conviction that both are directly 
intertwined, and that, consequently, the fight against terrorism has to go hand in hand with a suc-
cessful settlement of the conflict is, for example, clearly expressed in the European Security 
Strategy which was drawn up under the authority of the EU's High Representative for the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels European Council, 
i.e. the gathering of the heads of state or government of the member states of the European Un-
ion and the president of the European commission, in December 2003 as an European counter-
point to the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002. It claimed that ‘(t)he most 
practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older 
problems of regional conflict’,51 and culminated in the statement that the ‘(r)esolution of the Ar-
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ab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of 
dealing with other problems in the Middle East.’52 This point was also stressed by former EU 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gies de Vries who had been appointed to this position in re-
sponse to the Madrid train bombings. He portrayed getting ‘the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
back on course’ as ‘a central component of any strategy to combat terrorism’.53  
In an article Javier Solana published in the Financial Times in the immediate aftermath of the 
Madrid bombing, he also combined ‘our determination to understand and tackle the factors be-
hind terrorism’ with an elaboration on the need for ‘addressing the legitimate needs of the Pales-
tinian people’ which ‘would deal a heavy blow to terrorism.’54 The extent to which he adopts the 
point of view of the authoritarian Arab governments, i.e. that it is not their domestic failings, but 
the external source of the Arab-Israeli conflict that supposedly brings about terrorism, is evident 
by the fact that he mentions ‘good governance and the rule of law’ only as an afterthought in the 
context of the ‘fight for regional stability.’55 In another article on what he termed the ‘Intelligent 
War on Terror’, Solana completely omitted any mention of democracy and human rights when 
arguing that ‘(r)egional conflicts cause anger and resentment. The unresolved Arab-Israeli prob-
lem leads to the rise of radicalism and extremism.’56 
In its 2002 appraisal of the EU’s counterterrorism policy, the European parliament seemed to 
share this view by declaring that ‘solving the Middle-East conflict in accordance with UN resolu-
tions is an essential element in the fight against terrorism’ and that ‘the political dialogue should 
focus more sharply on particular countries having key regional roles, such as India, Pakistan, 
Iran and the Arab states, and that relations with these countries be strengthened through appro-
priate instruments of cooperation and assistance.’57 In a striking allusion to the pro-authoritarian 
voices within the Arab debate, it linked in a resolution of February 2007 Islamist terrorism not 
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only ‘to inherent conflicts within the Muslim world’ but also ‘to struggles for power and natural 
resources, including oil.’ 58 
What is critical with these associations and thematizations is that the overt emphasis on ‘global’ 
or ‘regional’ problems not only fails to address the distinctive role of Middle Eastern authoritari-
an regimes themselves as a possible cause of terrorist violence. While the popularity of Islamist 
propaganda is obviously helped by graphic images of violence that seem to validate radical in-
terpretations of western and Israeli intentions, the Arab governments use the conflict to forestall 
the discussion of domestic issues. If one accepts the argument that firstly Islamist terrorism is 
linked to the state of the Arab-Israeli conflict and secondly regional conflicts are solvable only in 
multilateral engagements with a region’s main players, then the authoritarian Arab governments 
are able to connect their own existence with the fight against Islamist terrorism.  
Thus, by contextualizing Islamist terrorism as a phenomenon more or less directly linked to the 
international arena, the EU helps to turn ‘regional stability’ into a euphemism for the continued 
support of the authoritarian Arab status quo. 
 
 Framing Domestic Arab Issues in Terms of the EU’s Trade Strategy 
For a long time the so-called Barcelona process, launched in 1995, was treated as the central 
channel of EU engagement with its southern neighbourhood.
59
 Its importance for our analysis 
lies in the fact that long before the manifestation of transnational Islamist terrorism through the 
attacks of 9/11, in Riyadh 2003, in Madrid 2004, in London and Egypt 2005, the fight against 
terrorism moved up to the top of the international agenda. The representatives of the Council of 
the European Union, the European Commission, member states of the European Union and non-
European Mediterranean countries issued a joint statement that mentions many of the aspects 
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covered in the contemporary Arab and European debates on counterterrorism and its relation to 
political reform. 
One of its most striking features was the fact that the tension between notions of political reform 
and sovereignty had been solved in favour of the latter. This was the case when the signatories 
pledged to ‘develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing 
in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-
cultural, economic and judicial system’ and to ‘respect their sovereign equality and all rights in-
herent in their sovereignty.’60 Any lingering chance that the Barcelona statement might create 
(rhetorical) leverages for political reform was removed by the language on counterterrorism co-
operation stressing the focus on ‘stepping up exchanges of information and improving extradi-
tion procedures’ as well as ‘ratifying and applying the international instruments they have 
signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure (emphasis 
added).’ By adding acceptance of ‘the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account 
the diversity of the situation in each country’, Barcelona gave the authoritarian Arab govern-
ments the green light for any policy they deemed necessary to fight terrorism. This was especial-
ly worrisome given the Egyptian government’s broadening of the definition of terrorism to muz-
zle any form of peaceful political opposition.
61
  
These profound inconsistencies in the EU’s official rhetoric became apparent again in the al-
ready mentioned European Security Strategy. On the one hand, it admits that the ‘Mediterranean 
area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and 
unresolved conflicts’ and that ‘the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political cri-
ses, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies’ have to be considered as the 
causes of ‘the most recent wave of terrorism’;62 on the other hand, however, it completely omits 
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any mentioning of democratic reform from the call for ‘continued engagement with Mediterrane-
an partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework 
of the Barcelona Process.’63 
It was only with the terrorist attacks in Madrid, ‘Europe’s 9/11’64, that the EU moved toward 
stressing the linkages between the authoritarian Arab government’s failures and Europe’s securi-
ty. The ‘Declaration on Combating Terrorism’, which the European Council had issued two 
weeks after the terrorist attacks in Madrid, included a section on ‘the factors which contribute to 
support for, and recruitment into, terrorism’ that hinted at an understanding of the causes of Is-
lamist terrorism that is more in line with the assessment of Arab liberals. Specifically, the Euro-
pean Council called for both the ‘more efficient use of external assistance programmes to address 
factors which can contribute to the support for terrorism, including in particular support for good 
governance and the rule of law’, as well as for the development and implementation of a ‘strate-
gy to promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and the Islamic 
World.’65 Also, Javier Solana admitted in a speech at the East West-Institute’s Second Annual 
Worldwide Security Conference in February 2005 that ‘we need a comprehensive strategy tack-
ling both the manifestations and the underlying causes of terrorism, such as political alienation 
and radicalisation.’66  
The final version of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy of December 2005 remarked that the 
conditions which ‘may make the radical message more appealing (…) include poor or autocratic 
governance; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; lack of political or economic prospects and of 
educational opportunities’.67 However, it mentions democratization only as an afterthought to 
‘the provision of assistance to priority third countries - including in North Africa, the Middle 
East and South East Asia’ and relegates the matter to ‘the dialogue and alliance between cultures, 
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faiths, and civilisations.’68 As such it represents a variation of Gies de Vries’ noncommittal 
pledge to strengthen the EU’s ‘links with moderate and modernising Muslims in North Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia on the basis of a shared commitment to democratic values’.69 
A couple of weeks before the London terrorist attacks of July 2005, the European Parliament 
signalled its understanding of circumstances conducive to the emergence of Islamist terrorism by 
describing what it regarded as effective preventive counter-terrorism measures. Specifically, it 
mentioned ‘the promotion of new initiatives for peacemaking and mediation in societies which 
are marked by conflicts and division, by adopting long-term trade, aid and investment policies 
that advance the fight against poverty and help strengthen democratic institutions and transpar-
ency at national and at global level through initiatives which may contribute to these goals’.70 
This statement is significant in the sense that it largely reflects the interests of those political and 
economic elites that constitute or support the authoritarian Arab governments. By focusing on 
regional diplomacy and mentioning democracy only as the product of trade, aid and investment 
policies, the European parliament relegates the domestic set-up of the Arab countries to the sta-
tus of tertiary concern.  
In late 2002, it had already declared that ‘the fight against terrorism can never be won unless 
combined with a broad alliance aimed at eradicating poverty and installing democracy, respect 
for the rule of law and human rights worldwide’ since terrorism’s root causes were ‘poverty, 
human rights infringements, oppression and forcible relocation of persons, and lack of educa-
tion’.71 By connecting poverty with terrorism, even though this contradicts empirical evidence,72 
the EU links its interest in trade with the fight against terrorism. It also plays in the hands of the 
political elites in Cairo and Riyadh who are interested in setting up and diversifying their eco-
nomic links with the EU.  
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The extent to which Cairo is playing on European interests and sensitivities is highlighted by the 
swift and devastating way Egypt’s ruling elite and their media allies reacted in early 2008 to the 
European Parliament’s stinging critique of the human rights situation as well as the arbitrariness 
of governmental and judicial decisions in Egypt.
73
 The Egyptian parliament, for example, threat-
ened to cancel diplomatic relations with the EU and with the Euro-Mediterranean Council which 
is part of the aforementioned ‘Barcelona Process’. Egyptian foreign minister Ahmad Abu Al-
Gheit rejected the European Parliament’s resolution as ‘arrogant’ and ‘ignorant’ and proclaimed 
that Egypt would boycott scheduled political consultations with EU officials. Hosni Mubarak’s 
assertion that ‘(w)e will never agree to interference in our country’s internal affairs’ and that 
‘Egypt is implementing its reform agenda in accordance with its own values and experience, and 
without (importing) anyone else’s experience, or adopting an agenda that is at odds with its val-
ues, principles, and experience’74 demonstrates a remarkable linguistic affinity to the document 
that initiated the Barcelona process. Fathi Sorour, speaker of the Egyptian national assembly, 
countered with a call for the concentration on ‘Islamophobia in Europe’ and ‘Western hostility 
against Islamic values’ to be undertaken by the Union of Muslim Parliaments and pointed to 
support from the Damascus-based Arab Parliamentary Union that condemned the European Par-
liament’s resolution ‘which comes at a time when it turns a blind eye to Israeli atrocities in Gaza 
Strip’.75 
On the other hand, Mubarak’s regime did hesitate to accept a 558 Million Euro aid package 
through the EU’s Neighbourhood Partnership program. This decision was obviously made easier 
when the Commission assured that the program was based on ‘Egypt’s own reform agenda in the 
economic, social and political areas’76 and EU foreign affairs commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
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pledged that the EU will be ‘a loyal and sensitive partner, respectful of the sincerity of your 
commitment to the shared principles, supportive of your efforts to modernize and to reform.’77 
According to the independent European Policy Centre (EPC), the EU’s reluctance to bring do-
mestic sources of terrorism more forcefully into the discussion is directly linked to the concern 
that the application of the very principles which are sacredly upheld as EU governance such as 
democratization and the strengthening of civil society, can, at least momentarily, open avenues 
of political participation and increase the space for elements of radicalization, terrorism and in-
stability. As Fraser Cameron puts it: ‘(The) dilemma for the EU – and for the US – is that accel-
erated promotion of democracy and human rights in the Arab world risks undermining existing 
regimes that are sometimes helpful in counter-terrorism, and could lead to Islamic fundamental-
ists taking power who will then disregard democracy and human rights.’78  
Following this perspective, both strategies of either democratization or cooperation with the es-
tablished regimes would lead to human rights problems and a subversion of the principles of EU 
governance, either directly or indirectly. The only difference being that in the case that the EU 
supports secular authoritarianism, its other regional interests are perceived to be more likely 
guaranteed. However, by framing the problem in this way, the EU falls into the rhetorical trap 
laid out by the authoritarian Arab governments of the false choice between authoritarian stability 
and Islamist chaos.
79
 As the small minority of Arab liberal voices suggests, there exists a third 
option of protecting human and civil rights that underpin any vibrant civil society and which 
would protect the blossoming of alternative (liberal) forms of thinking about Islam’s role in poli-
tics and society. This raises the question of how the hegemonic Arab debate and the EU’s official 
statements frame the political role of Islam(ism) in the emergence of Islamist terrorism. 
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Avoiding the Culture Clash – Political Correctness and Islamist Terrorism  
The EU’s organs take great care in distinguishing between those Islamist ideologues who justify 
violence and terrorist acts and the vast peaceful majority of Muslims living in both the EU and 
the Arab world. With this sensible and prudent distinction, EU politicians help to fight a general 
portrayal of Muslims as radicals and their general susceptibility to terrorism. The empirically un-
founded talk of a ‘clash of civilizations’ does not only undermine inter-communal relations with-
in the EU, but also the external policies toward Arab and Muslim countries in general.  
This issue became all the more pressing with the post-Madrid focus on the inner-European situa-
tion of Arab and Muslim communities. It highlighted the connection between ‘home grown’ ter-
rorism and radicalization within EU countries and the discussion of their reasons, which can in-
deed partly be found in deficiently conceptualized national and EU immigration politics, past and 
present,
80
 and the Middle East’s ‘home grown’ problem of ‘failed’ or ‘belated’ modernization. 
This matter is stressed in the above-mentioned European Council’s post-Madrid strategy paper 
which called for an investigation into ‘the links between extreme religious or political beliefs, as 
well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for terrorism’.81 This realization culminat-
ed in a preliminary statement of the Council of the European Union, as the council of ministers 
representing the EU’s member states, that ‘(i)n the context of the most recent wave of terrorism, 
for example, the core of the issue is propaganda which distorts conflicts around the world as a 
supposed proof of a clash between the West and Islam.’82  
The problem with the official European approach is that the policies flowing from this under-
standing fail to address the link between this phenomenon and the interests of the authoritarian 
governments. A policy that focuses on ‘getting our own message across more effectively’ and 
‘engaging with civil society and faith groups that reject the ideas put forward by terrorists and 
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extremists that incite violence’ as well as the development of a ‘non-emotive lexicon’83 might be 
suitable for the intra-European context, but will remain insufficient as long as the Arab world’s 
authoritarian governments nurture countervailing rhetoric in pursuit of their own interest in re-
gime survival. Given the frequently highlighted transnational dimension of Islamist terrorism as 
well as the linkages between radicalized individuals and groups in both the immigrant communi-
ties and the respective countries of origin, this approach seems one-sided and thus doomed to 
fail.  
The zeal for political correct language in addressing the political ideology based on a selective 
reading of Islamic precepts must go hand in hand with attempts to address what Arab liberals 
criticize as the complicity of many religious authorities in the Middle East in the handy availabil-
ity of justifications for terrorist violence. As demonstrated above, the images of western aggres-
sion do not only serve the Arab governments’ attempt to delegitimize foreign calls for political 
reform, they also serve the interest of traditional religious elites in delegitimizing alternative lib-
eral religious thinking. That means that as long as authoritarian Arab governments openly sup-
port anti-western images in an effort to stem the tide of political reform, no level of linguistic 
hygiene on the part of the EU can prevent the distortion of its domestic and foreign policies. 
 
Conclusion 
While there is an obvious divide between the Arab and EU debates regarding the assessment of 
past and present forms of western politics, both merge in the statement and concession that past 
forms of western imperialism and enforced modernization are responsible for contemporary rad-
icalization in the Arab world. The underlying analysis fits well with the EU’s focus on multilat-
eral means of conflict resolution and trade promotion as counterterrorism strategies. From the 
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perspective of political reform in the Middle East the problem arises that it ends up negotiating 
the debate into rhetorical territory easily amendable to the interests of the authoritarian Arab 
governments. While there are certainly external factors at play, both debates manage, or at least 
play a certain role in, producing and sustaining a red herring that legitimizes, or, as in the case of 
the EU, does at least not strictly delegitimize the emerging Islamist terrorist violence which 
claims to arise from conflicts such as the one between Israel and its Arab neighbours.
84
  
Marginalized liberal and self-critical voices in the Arab world coincide with cautious assess-
ments from within the EU that are also prepared to focus on totalitarian aspects of radical and 
violent Islamist movements. Both debates can be characterized by a critical inward focus on their 
own societies in order to make out causes for terrorism instead of looking for such causes in for-
eign countries/regions and thereby distracting (intentionally, or not) from problems at home. 
The distinctions between radical, totalitarian aspects of Islamism and moderate, peaceful under-
standings of Islam are undoubtedly based on appropriate political judgement. However, the EU 
faces the problem that certain interpretations of Islam have lent themselves to the fortification of 
authoritarian regimes in the Arab world in exchange for a (relatively) free hand in the excommu-
nication of divergent liberal religious views. This challenge became even more virulent with the 
post-Madrid and post-London recognition that what may be considered as the appropriate means 
of ‘defending Islam’ in some quarters of the Arab world can pose a problem through the conver-
sion and transnational radicalization of migrant communities for the EU itself. It is at this point 
that a stronger focus within the EU debate on the critical, liberal voices in Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt could help overcome a way of talking about terrorism that (intentionally and/or not) nur-
tures a debate that supports the authoritarian regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  
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